Much of the discussion surrounding the state of post-World War II Europe focuses on the sheer volume of death and destruction. With almost 43 million Europeans dead and countless houses, factories, and entire towns wasted by intense shelling and collateral damage, this is easy to do; viewing such graphic images and reading or listening about the war-time atrocities evokes an intense, visceral reaction that is inherently addictive. While the sheer volume of this carnage certainly makes it a topic worthy of study, using this as your only approach to understanding World War II’s legacy neglects the human and sociological impacts of the war. In order to counter this bias towards the macabre, this post will instead focus on the movement of people and how this vast displacement impacted societies and economies in specific European countries as well as the overall global community and perspective.
Gerard Cohen throws out a few statistics regarding these displaced persons in the introduction and first chapter of his book In War’s Wake. Here, Cohen dictates that in 1946, there were 8 million displaced persons in Germany alone. Further, Cohen first introduces the International Refugee Organization (IRO) in this chapter, a defunct UN agency that “forced the European refugee problem to the center of the international stage” and ultimately facilitated a shift in thinking that made the resettlement of displaced persons a top property (Cohen 9). The idea that displaced person present a threat to the political and economic stability is revisited in chapter five of In War’s Wake. In this chapter, Cohen explores the economic aspects associated with mass displacement (and resettlement) and its connection with societal and global thoughts and feelings. Despite the expectation that displaced persons would replace the human resources lost to war, the reality of post-World War II Europe is that there was overpopulation and a job market that was inadequate to address that overpopulation. In Germany, there were “millions of ethnic German expellees already clogging the local employment market” (Cohen 109). This meant that refugees were a burden on the economy; there simply were not enough jobs to go around. Between refugees and migrant workers, Europe was estimated to have 5 million “surplus men” at the start of the 1950s (Cohen 119). This widespread “idleness” was not a part of the United Nations plan to restore Europe after World War II, and, combined with good old 20th-century xenophobia set the stage for a mass campaign of emigration.
One of the outlets for these refugees was the creation of Israel. A Jewish nation-state created by the United Nations in 1948 as a home for Jews all across the world – and especially those displaced by the Holocaust and seeking a new home. For the sake of historical context, it is important to note that – at the time – “Jews [were] not be settled in proportion to other displaced person” and “rarely considered the Jews” for mining and hard labor jobs” (Cohen 115). On the other hand, many Jews – especially Holocaust survivors – had no desire to stay on the mainland continent. Thus, there was a sort of mutual disdain between the two parties. This discrimination extended across the Atlantic with Argentinian and Brazilian immigration policies structured to favor refugees with a Catholic and/or Latin background (Cohen 116). With all of this in mind, it is easy to understand the rationale behind (and necessity) for the creation of a Jewish state. Politically, Israel was the perfect option for resolving the overpopulation and labor shortage plaguing Europe. From a Jewish perspective, they were able to consolidate into one state, free of anti-semitism and a step closer to healing the wounds inflicted by Nazi Germany and the Holocaust. From a European perspective, the resettlement of these Jews freed them from the burden of overpopulation and ultimately helped improve the continental economy.
I like how you pointed out that most discussion on WWII focuses on the death and tragedy that occurred during the war not the aftermath. I think that this is because, as Americans, since we didn’t experience tragedy after the war we assume it wasn’t a thing.
The idea that “refugees were a burden on the economy; there simply were not enough jobs to go around” I would say is an argument that is still being made today. There was one quote from Cohen that stuck out to me, “The amount of work that DPs contribute, concluded a report issued by the US army in 1946 is only a fraction of the effort necessary to maintain them.” Considering the cost and amount of supplies and necessities that were needed to maintain the 8 million displaced people in Germany alone can only be described as monumental.
It is interesting to see how Europe developed after the war and was shaped to how it is today. It certainly seemed as if states were very particular in their intake of refugees and migrants during the population shifts. To see how Israel became a state is a strong example of how much the population of the continent shifted.
The formation did indeed take some pressure off of the overpopulation dilemma in Europe. However, it didn’t solve it completely. Where did the rest of the non-Jewish DP immigrate to? Were countries more open to them or more selective? And how did the Jews feel about being herded into Israel? Were all of them supportive of its formation?
I can completely understand why Jewish people chose to leave Europe after the war. Many probably already knew the feelings of their neighbors and fellow countrymen before the war, but with many countries, they saw the war as a way to let those feelings out against them. After knowing this, who would want to stay?