The Second World War left Europe in ruins and millions of people with out homes or hundreds of miles from their homes. Franklin D. Roosevelt predicted such an outcome in 1939. FDR stated the end of the war would bring about “the problem of the human refugee”(Cohen, 1). In 1943, two years prior to the war’s end, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was founded to help alleviated the problems created by Displaced Persons (DPs). However, in 1946 there was a projected million people still left in a state of ambiguity.
The DP problem became more complex as the emerging postwar world powers fought to establish control. After the war ended the common bond over anti-fascism was no longer in place to hold the Eastern and Western powers together. Competition for influence grew, including the pressing question of what to do with DPs. Gerard Daniel Cohen chronicles the ‘Battle of Refugees’ in his book, In War’s Wake. The Allies and the Soviets debated over how to define DPs, whether or not to forcibly relocate them, and if a DP chose to stay what aid should be allocated (Cohen, 19). While many DPs eagerly wished to go home some did not want to relocate. There was also debate over the amount of relief aid the DPs should receive.
The International Refugee Organization (IRO) established by the UN helped answer some of the questions that the UNRRA could not solve. However the passing of IRO legislation deepened the divide between the Allies and the Soviets. The IRO was a predominately Western institution with Western interests (Cohen, 24). The Soviets immediately rejected the IRO and withdrew from the program. The IRO sought to clarify some aspects left untouched by the UNRRA. Notably, it did not support anyone who had helped the enemy. Therefore ethnic Germans received no aid.
Hand-painted cover for IRO meeting. September 13, 1948The movement of refugees across Europe after the war was one of the largest forced population redistributions. In an attempted to carry out DeGermanification the allies sent ethnic Germans out of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Austria back into Germany. An estimated 500,000 of these Germans did not survive the trip back and many of them lived in conditions not much better than concentration camps once they arrived (Douglas, 1-4). R.M. Douglas in his article, The European Atrocity You Never Heard About, describes how the Allies operate with an amount of ‘cognitive dissonance’. Douglas points out that the Allies tried Nazi high officials at Nuremberg on crimes against humanity. Often referencing force relocation as one of the crimes. Douglas acknowledges the irony between the Nuremberg trials and the violations of human rights later carried out postwar while relocating civilian populations (Douglas, 2).
The difference between human rights advocated for and human rights given was hotly debated between the Soviets and the West. In plans for relocation of refugees the West sought what was best for the individual. Meanwhile, the Soviets focused on the health of the state when discussing population redistribution. After the Soviets refused to join the IRO these tensions intensified. The US, Great Britain, and the USSR all sought different plans to handle the refugee problem (Cohen, 10). Each country had their own national interests in mind. For example, although the US advocated for the psychological and physical health of the individual their previous policies of isolationism and immigration quotas meant they did not want to accept refugees. Instead the USA sought to delegate the relocation of refugees rather than open its doors. The DPs struggled to find their national identities, meanwhile the emerging powers puppeteered their movements in order to best benefit their national motives.
References:
Link to Photo: http://www.unpi.com/clem/unpostcards/unrracatalog.pdf
Cohen, Gerard Daniel. In War’s Wake: Europe’s Displaced Persons in the Postwar Order. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Douglas, R. M. “The European Atrocity You Never Heard About.” The Chronicle of Higher Education, June 11, 2012.
Author: Kathryn Poos
3 thoughts on “The DP Question Adding Pressure to the Cold War”
I agree that the allied governments used refugees as pawns for political motives. An example of a government’s interest that had nothing to do with the wants or needs of the displaced person is the French policy of taking children of German descent to augment their population. They demanded the return of lost human capital because German population represented “a threat to European security.” People were picked up and moved around based on the interests of a particular country. I think it is very important/nice that you pointed out that “while many DPs eagerly wished to go home some did not want to relocate.” The individual desires of displaced people were complex because people are not all the same. While the allies argued over generalizations of displaced people, they sometimes seemed to forget that people are not homogenous as our experiences are different. You cannot force people to relocate.
Pointing out the USA’s lack of accepting people was a great point. I believe America was still afraid of letting its doors open. At the time, we had just came off of a huge isolation period and we weren’t accustomed to those who immigrated in. There were so many cultures that were needing something, and I would argue that the people back home were afraid to let those cultures and ideas into our country.
I like how you focus more so on the growing political divide of the immediate Postwar. The immediate 5 years after the war is something I’ve never really thought about, especially with regards to Displaced Persons. The growing political divide is something i touch on in my own post, but I did not think of tying in Douglas’ writing from the previous week. It truly was hypocritical for the allies to try the Nazis on charges of displacing people, while they were doing the exact same thing themselves.
I agree that the allied governments used refugees as pawns for political motives. An example of a government’s interest that had nothing to do with the wants or needs of the displaced person is the French policy of taking children of German descent to augment their population. They demanded the return of lost human capital because German population represented “a threat to European security.” People were picked up and moved around based on the interests of a particular country. I think it is very important/nice that you pointed out that “while many DPs eagerly wished to go home some did not want to relocate.” The individual desires of displaced people were complex because people are not all the same. While the allies argued over generalizations of displaced people, they sometimes seemed to forget that people are not homogenous as our experiences are different. You cannot force people to relocate.
Pointing out the USA’s lack of accepting people was a great point. I believe America was still afraid of letting its doors open. At the time, we had just came off of a huge isolation period and we weren’t accustomed to those who immigrated in. There were so many cultures that were needing something, and I would argue that the people back home were afraid to let those cultures and ideas into our country.
I like how you focus more so on the growing political divide of the immediate Postwar. The immediate 5 years after the war is something I’ve never really thought about, especially with regards to Displaced Persons. The growing political divide is something i touch on in my own post, but I did not think of tying in Douglas’ writing from the previous week. It truly was hypocritical for the allies to try the Nazis on charges of displacing people, while they were doing the exact same thing themselves.