Necessary Myths

Soviet Solider returns from Service 1945

The return and discharge of soldiers after a conflict has always been a far off concern to those fighting during the conflict. In times of war, especially during such catastrophic wars as World War II the only goals are survival and destruction of the enemy. This was how the Soviets thought just as like for the rest of the powers who participated in World War II, but unlike the rest of those powers, the Soviet Union had suffered the most causalities and had the largest amount of soldiers to demilitarize. The demilitarization of the Soviet Army led to massive problems, from inadequate housing, to lack of of available jobs.The Soviet Union could not afford to publicize these logistical shortcomings and instead they weaved what they saw as a necessary myth of a swift, efficient, and glorious homecoming of the demilitarized Soviet Army.

Historians Martin Crotty and Mark Edele have suggested eight variables for determining a nations ability and willingness to support their veterans,

(1) the perceived moral debt owed by the rest of society to its former solders; (2) the conscript or volunteer status of the soldiers; (3) the relativity between soldiers’ and non-soldiers’ service and sacrifice for the war effort; (4) the existence, efficiency and unity of the veterans’ movements; (5) the democratic or non-democratic nature of the government; (6) the state’s fear of its veterans and its ability to suppress veterans’ violence; (7) the state’s ability to meet the economic and financial demands of its veterans; and (8) the existence or non-existence of a welfare state.  (Crotty and Edele, 19)

Using these variables, it is easy to see that the Soviet Union could and would not swiftly demilitarize its army efficiently. First off there were different criteria for how much moral debt soldiers were owed, from those with significant wounds to officers who had never served on the front line. A large portion of the Soviet military were volunteers, but at the same time millions were also conscripted, further complicating the equality of demilitarization. Initially veterans were told that the would be rapidly discharged and sent back to their old lives, but because of the enormity of the task the Soviet bureaucracy slowly demilitarized the army over years instead of over months.  In addition the Soviet Union was a welfare state, dedicated to taking care of not only its veterans but all of its citizens; a task made impossible by the economic destruction brought on by the war.

All of these variables and more led to the mistreatment and slow inefficient demilitarization of the Soviet Army. Many returning soldiers could not even leave the military at all, an obstacle they blamed on the bureaucracy as historian Robert Dale points out “The frustrations of demobilization were blamed on ‘rear-line rats’, a term of derision for officials believed to have shirked front-line service in favor of safer administrative jobs. These problems were not imagined by dis- affected veteran” (Dale, 113). Those that did make it home relatively quickly were greeted with destruction and competition for jobs from citizens as well as other veterans”Demobilized soldiers returning to Stalingrad would have found a city reduced to rubble, their families living in basements or dugouts.31 Veterans everywhere experienced considerable difficulty in readjusting to civilian life” (Dale, 120). Though the the reality of demilitarization was grim and fraught with difficulties, the propaganda that the Soviet Union dispensed to the general public was one of a glorious return of the soldiers.

On Sunday 8 July 1945 a military parade through the streets of Leningrad was organized to honor the city’s heroic wartime defenders. Tens of thousands of Leningraders thronged the streets, expecting to receive the specially chosen guards’ regiments in a manner befitting heroes… The parade received extensive local and national press coverage. Articles and photographs recorded women and children showering the troops with bouquets of flowers and reported poignant cases of soldiers reunited with families after years of separation. (Crotty and Edele, 113-114)

The above picture is a reflection of how the Soviets wanted the public to view their returning veterans, as war heroes finally reunited with their families. Propaganda was spread throuhout the the Soviet Union with pictures accompanied by touching captions of reunification and soldiers were told they were receiving treatment of a quality unimagined in the West. The reasoning behind behind all of the smoke and mirrors was that the Soviet Union could not afford to properly discharge all of their veterans at once, the Soviet economy was in shambles after five years of war, and it was against the principals of Communism to favor a specific group of people. The Soviets instead decided to create a necessary myth for both the civilian populace and the army.This myth was designed to keep the populace ignorant of the massive logistical problem crated by demilitarization, hopefully that the future will be brighter and that the war was worth it, and most importantly to avoid chaos and a repeat of the Russian Civil War (1917-1922) where veterans and various factions tried to grab power after World War I.